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Who Fought the Battle.

Strength of the Union and Confederate Forces Compared.

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An Address
By Capt. Thos. Speed
before the
Army Corps Society
of Louisville, Ky.
January 26, 1904

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Who Fought the Battle

STRENGTH OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE FORCES COMPARED

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INTRODUCTION.

The following address was delivered by Capt. Thomas Speed before the "Army Corps Society," which is an organization in Louisville, Ky., the objects and purposes of which are shown in its Constitution, Article II:

"The object of this society is the formation of a social and friendly organization of men who actually served in the Union Army in the Civil War, or who are connected with that cause, for the purpose of interchange of thought and information, and to be prepared to take action, or exert influence, in such manner and upon such occasions as may be deemed expedient and appropriate."

At a regular meeting on January 26, 1904, the subject for consideration that evening was presented in an address by Captain Speed, entitled, "Who Fought the Battle?"—being a study of the case according to the official records and other authentic sources of information, showing from whence the soldiery came who fought in the great Civil War, and the numbers engaged on the opposite sides.

Upon hearing the address there was such general approval and commendation that a resolution was unanimously adopted to publish it, and a committee appointed to have charge of the work. Their duty having been performed, the address is herewith offered to the public.

ANDREW COWAN,
WM. BAILEY,
ALFRED PIRTLE,
Committee.

Who Fought the Battle

The United States stands to-day the foremost nation on the globe. As we contemplate this magnificent fact, we read with wonder a sentiment expressed by Alexander Stephens in his history of our Civil War, published in 1870. He tells of a soldier, in the agonies of a mortal wound, exclaiming, "What is it all for?" Taking this as a text, he asks: "Why this array of armies? Why this fierce meeting in mortal combat? What is all this slaughter and carnage for?" He answers, declaring that on the part of the North it was to overturn the principles upon which our government was based—a war against right, against reason, justice and truth. The burden of the argument of his two large volumes is that State supremacy and the right of secession lie at the basis of our system, and without their complete recognition our system is a despotism. No less urgent for State supremacy and the right of secession is Jefferson Davis, who published his two large volumes in 1881.

Both Stephens and Davis strenuously maintain the "rope of sand" theory of the republic, that any State could rightfully withdraw and set up an entirely independent nationality.

The array of armies, the mortal combat, the carnage and slaughter, were all made necessary by the attempt to carry into actual execution this theory, which involved the destruction of all the hopes of the republic. Common sense repudiated the folly; and to resist the dismemberment of the Union and save the grandest structure of

government ever known to mankind, more than three hundred thousand soldiers laid down their lives. It was for this that we had the vast array of armies and terrible bloodshed, and it is because of this devotion to the flag of our country, that we now have the spectacle of our great republic leading all the nations of the world in liberty, equality, prosperity and strength.

For nearly forty years we have had a restored national union. It has grown in the respect and admiration of all the peoples of the earth. It has the pride and love of all its own citizens. Its system is not a rope of sand. It is strong in its unity, and, instead of being a despotism, it is the same government of the people by the people on the foundations laid by the fathers.

The magnitude of the task of saving the Union, when the great trouble came, was much noticed and commented on at the time.

The Southern movement was so vast, and the power of the Union apparently so inadequate, it was regarded as an impossible thing forcibly to coerce the seceded States.

The movement appeared far greater than an insurrection or rebellion, and was more in the nature of a division of the country. Many counseled acquiescence. The leaders of the Confederacy derided the thought of coercion. They said that history contained no precedent for forcible resistance to a separation on so large a scale. The proposition of restoring the Union by force was greeted with jeering at home and abroad. The London Times summed up the prevailing idea by saying: "The Southern States may be wrong, but they are ten millions." John Bright wrote: "I can not see how the South, with its vast territory, is to be subdued. The belief is largely held that the subjugation of the South is barely, if at all, possible." The

philosopher Darwin wrote to his friend, Prof. Asa Gray: "How curious it is that you can think you can conquer the South! I never meet a soul who thinks it possible."

A leading foreign journal said: "The Union seems to be destined to fall without a struggle, without a lament, without an epitaph," . . . that "the Union is effectually divided into rival confederacies," . . . that "reunion can never be expected."

On every hand it was heard that the Southern Confederacy was an established fact; that it could defend itself, and that there was not enough power in the nation to overthrow it.

The outlook was appalling. Instead of one American republic, with one flag, and one purpose and destiny, there were to be two, filled with bitter contention. Inevitably following would be other separations, until the land would be divided and subdivided into factions endlessly warring with each other.

The calamity was averted. The great battle was fought, and now it is a natural desire to know who saved the Union. What part and class of the people rallied to the flag? What were the numbers engaged on the respective sides?

In 1861 the United States was far from being the power it is to-day. Its entire population was then but little over thirty millions. The secession of eleven States, with large support from three others, arrayed ten millions against the remaining twenty. The burden of overthrowing the Confederacy fell upon a total population of about twenty millions, and this was diminished by unfortunate division of sentiment.

No proper estimate of the tremendous task can be had

without full consideration of the angry division of sentiment in the North. No feature in the history of the war period was more striking than the immense element in the North bitterly hostile to the war. The records now existing in files of papers, in speeches and writings, in results of elections, all show that a very large percentage of the population of the non-seceding States violently opposed the war and clogged the efforts of the Union cause in every possible way.

From this element there was no aid to the cause of the Union, but, on the contrary, great and serious obstruction, and corresponding encouragement to the cause of the South. Leaders of the school of Vallandigham and Voorhees were in every State. Their following was so large, they ran candidates for office with real and lively hopes of electing them, and often actually doing so. The expectations of success on the part of the Southern statesmen and generals were largely based upon dissension in the North.

Proofs of this might be adduced at great length, but a few quotations from an address by the Virginia Legislature in 1864 will suffice:

"Your enemies are appalled at the magnitude of the task before them."

"Dissensions exist among them."

"The war is no longer popular."

"A large, a growing party are for peace."

"A still larger party have discovered that the war so far has only served to entail upon themselves a despotism which tramples down every public and private right."

"Torn by party and personal strife, and conscious of the impotence of their scheme of conquest, the ranks of your enemies are already beginning to waver."

From all the evidences, especially from the extreme tone of newspapers which had wide circulation, and from votes cast at elections, it is safe to say at least one fourth of the population of the non-seceded States opposed the war. This element furnished no soldiers to the Union cause, but, on the contrary, gave untold trouble to the country. The strength of the loyal element had to be exerted not only to suppress the organized rebellion in the South, but also to keep down the active machinations of these disloyal foes in the rear. Troops had to be employed to guard prisons against their uprisings, and to suppress riots incited by them. They were unceasing in discouraging enlistments and in other opposition to the war. They were so numerous they kept in countenance, glorying in the name "Copperhead," and rejoicing over every Confederate success. Their motto was, "No more men and no more money for this nefarious war." Such was the spirit of that element which burdened the nation while its patriots were suffering and dying for it at the front.

We have recently seen, in the Philippine troubles, the effect of malcontent home opposition in prolonging the struggle, and causing the death of both natives and soldiers. This faintly illustrates the virulence of this element in our great struggle, and the burden it was to the country. The battle for the Union was fought by volunteers from the loyal portion of the loyal States, not from the entire population. And many who went into the service can never forget the insults, taunts and jeers under which they left, and which greeted them if they had opportunity to revisit their homes.

The object in mentioning this element is to point the fact that from it no soldiers went to the Union Army; and when it is deducted from the twenty millions of population

in the non-seceding States, we find that the burden of the war fell upon the remaining three-fourths, or not over fifteen millions of population.

There was no corresponding division of sentiment in the South. On the contrary, it is the universal testimony that the Confederacy was united in one sentiment and animated by a unanimous enthusiasm. Alexander Stephens, in his history, uses this language: "No people on earth were ever more unanimous in any cause than were the people of the South." . . . There was not one in ten thousand of the people, at least in ten of the Southern States, whose heart and soul was not thoroughly enlisted in the cause."

From the divided population of twenty millions, enough soldiers had to be drawn to overcome the undivided ten millions on their own ground. Such was the situation. What were the numbers of combatants each side sent to the field? What forces fought the battle on the respective sides?

To answer this question, the records are sufficient to make a close approximation, and the records must tell the story. All statements and estimates which ignore the records are worthless. Wild figures are constantly given, but to maintain an obstinate and defiant folly, like the Reverend Jasper, neither makes science nor history.

Alexander Stephens gravely writes as follows in his history:

"One of the most striking features was the great disparity between the numbers of forces on the opposite sides. From beginning to end quite 2,000,000 more Federal troops were brought into the field than the entire force of the Confederates. The Federal records show that they had from first to last 2,600,000 men in the service,

while the Confederates, all told, could not have much, if any, exceeded 600,000."

This character of general statement is found in all the Southern accounts. It is made to appear in books, pamphlets, magazines, papers, speeches and even inscribed upon monuments.

A late expression is by the Governor of Louisiana, at the Annual Reunion of Confederates at New Orleans, 1903. He says:

"With a total enlistment of 600,000 you confronted 2,800,000."

When writers and speakers so express themselves, it must be from ignorance or from willful misrepresentation. If from ignorance, it is inexcusable, for the record facts are open to all. If from a deliberate purpose to mislead, it is unwise, for the use of such figures will cause intelligent people to discredit any other statement they make.

We will first inquire as to the alleged 2,700,000* Federal soldiers, and then consider how the actual number on the Confederate side compares with the alleged 600,000. The number 2,700,000 never represented the number of soldiers in the armies of the Union, and never purported to do so. All it ever represented was the total number of *enlistments* appearing on the records, regardless of how the number was made up.

The same records which give the figures 2,700,000 expressly show that the 2,700,000 enlistments were made up by numerous *re-enlistments*. One man enlisting twice or thrice, each time increased the number of enlistments; but he was only one man.

If every individual soldier in the war had enlisted

* Round numbers. In Hay and Nicholay's Life of Lincoln it is said: "There were 2,690,401 names on the rolls, but these included re-enlistments."

twice, the 2,700,000 figure would represent just half that many men, or 1,350,000. The records do not show that this occurred, but they do show that at least one-third or more of the 2,700,000 recorded enlistments are re-enlistments.

At the first, it was not supposed the war would be of long duration, and men were called out for one hundred days' service. There were also six-months, nine-months, twelve-months and three-years organizations. All this was natural, as the war continued longer than was at first expected. So also it was natural that, as the short-term organizations went out of service, the men comprising them, would enter the service again in the longer-term organizations. In this way hundreds of thousands were added to the record of enlistments without increase of men. In the years 1863 and 1864 a very large proportion of the three-years men re-enlisted in the Veteran organization, and this increased the record of enlistments largely over 200,000, without adding a single soldier. This fact in regard to the 2,700,000 aggregate of enlistments has been set forth at large in ways and times innumerable. To ignore it is simple obstinacy. It is, in fact, what is called "Cyclopedia information." Appleton's American Cyclopedia, published in 1876, gives the number of enlistments, and says the 2,700,000 "does not correctly represent the number of different persons under arms, as it includes re-enlistments." The Encyclopedia Brittanica gives 1,500,000 as the total number of soldiers in the Federal armies. Greeley's history of the war, published in 1866, gives the total of enlistments and adds: "As many of these were mustered in twice or thrice, it is probable there were not more than 1,500,000 men." In Scribner's "Campaigns," a volume of "Statistics" gives the total of enlistments,

and adds, "Men who re-enlisted are counted twice or more often." The actual number of men who by enlisting and re-enlisting made up the paper record of 2,700,000 has been variously estimated from 1,500,000 to 2,000,000. It is conservative to place it at not over 1,700,000. It is not at all probable that it reached 2,000,000.

Upon this point the census of 1890 is useful in the same way that it is useful in ascertaining the number of the Confederates, as will presently appear. This census shows the total number of soldiers and sailors of the United States living in 1890 to be 1,034,000. Allowing 1,000,000 of these to be ex-soldiers of the Civil War, it would be impossible, by adding all who had died, to swell the number up to 2,700,000. If we add the 350,000 who lost their lives during the war, it would require that 650,000 should have died between the close of the war and 1890, in order even to reach 2,000,000, and as this is excessive, it shows there must have been fewer than 2,000,000, all told.

This is confirmed by another fact: It is a record fact that there were 1,000,000 volunteers to be discharged at the close of the war.* Adding the 350,000, who lost their lives in the war, it would require over 1,200,000 additional to make 2,700,000, which is so palpably excessive, it shows that it was by the re-enlisting of the same men that the 2,700,000 aggregate of enlistments was made up.

There are exact records of the enlistment of all the Federal soldiers, according to the various terms for which they enlisted. From these records calculation has been made of the number if all are put on a three-year basis. The result is 1,556,678, which number in reality represents

* They were scattered all over the country, some in the main armies, and others guarding thousands of posts in cities and towns, and along railroads, and generally protecting the territory which had come under their control.

the actual Federal force which contended with the Confederate force obtainable by volunteering and conscription.

From all that has been said it is plain that, instead of 2,700,000 soldiers in the Federal armies, the number was considerably below 2,000,000. And according to the best estimates it did not exceed a figure between 1,500,000 and 1,700,000, all told. This latter is the number given by Woodrow Wilson in his recently published history. His language is that the Federal forces were "in all 1,700,000." It is but reasonable to conclude that this distinguished historian has given these figures after investigating the records, and making the proper deduction from the aggregate of enlistments which is required by re-enlistments.

It was this band of 1,700,000 patriots, who went to the field from the loyal portion of the population of the non-seceding States, who fought the battle. They were not furnished by the total population, but went from that element of the people who saw nothing but ruin and disaster in a dismembered union.

What was the number on the Confederate side? The various estimates have been gathered in a volume entitled "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War," by Colonel Livermore, of Boston, but it would be impracticable to go over them all at this time.

We have seen that Stephens gives 600,000 as the total from first to last. Many others make the same statement. Adjutant General Cooper says no record of the number is to be found. In 1869 Dr. Joseph Jones, a Confederate surgeon, published a pamphlet, stating that "the available Confederate force, capable of active service in the field, did not during the entire war exceed 600,000." He says his "calculation is given only as an approximation."

In a recent able address by General Thruston, of Nashville, an ex-Federal officer, he says that Dr. Jones' figures have been followed and republished in various forms, and quoted and requoted until in the South they have come to be regarded in some sort as official.

In the South the number 600,000 is popularly stated as the total of the Confederate soldiers. So firmly is it fixed that it controls any and all other figures.

Those who have sworn by the 600,000 figure are ready to dismiss every statement that conflicts. And yet the sole foundation for it consists in estimates which complacently disregard the record figures. The statement of Dr. Jones is that "the available force, capable of effective service in the field, did not during the entire war exceed 600,000 men." At the very beginning of this inquiry we may well ask, if the "available force capable of effective service in the field" was 600,000, what was the number of those not so available and effective? For these must be added to arrive at the whole, just as in giving the total on the Federal side, all are counted, including militia and "emergency men" and irregular organizations and veteran reserves, organized at the very end of the war, the greater part of whom never served in any capacity. General Thruston has pointed out that the average *effective* strength of the Federal army was sixty-five per cent. of the enrollment, and that in the same proportion Dr. Jones' 600,000 would represent an enrollment of about 1,000,000.

In order to see the extravagant statements which are made, attention may be directed to almost any one published.

Among the publications in the papers at the time of the Confederate Reunion in Louisville, in the year 1900, was an article by W. V. Moore, who claimed familiarity with the

records, having worked upon them with Gen. Marcus J. Wright. Moore professed earnest desire to arrive at the truth, and worked it out that there were 650,000 Confederate soldiers, all told. When we examine his work, we are not impressed with the sincerity of his professions. For instance, he says: "The records show that it was a conflict wherein the aggregate of the forces engaged was in the ratio of about *five to one*; the Federal enlistments in army and navy running up to more than 3,000,000 as against the 650,000 Confederates." He also states that 700,000 men for the Federal armies were imported directly from Europe, and that the South furnished 500,000 soldiers to the Federal armies!

Here is seen the animus behind the figures. He is too intelligent so to mistake the aggregate number of Federal enlistments as to make five Yankees to one Southerner, or to make the other statements seriously. We then look to the processes by which he produces the result of 650,000, and we are reminded of the unjust steward who went to his master's debtors and asked, "How much owest thou?" And when a debtor said, "One hundred measures," he was told to write it down "fifty." Moore's method is to take the number of soldiers claimed to have been furnished by the several States, and estimate them down. By so doing, he cuts down Virginia to 60,000, Georgia to 90,000, Tennessee to 80,000 and all the others in like proportion. Even with these arbitrary substractions, the 600,000 figure is exceeded, and without them the number would have exceeded 1,000,000.

In this same article it is shown that the total number of Confederate soldiers who lost their lives during the war was 337,000. Bearing this figure in mind, we turn to the historic report made at the same reunion by Gen. Stephen

D. Lee, and there we find that, according to the census of 1890, there were then living 432,000 Confederate soldiers. If we add the 337,000, we have 766,000, to which must be added all who died in the twenty-five years between the close of the war and 1890. In view of these statements, what becomes of the 600,000 figure?

On this point, we may note that General Thruston gives the figures engraved on a monument at Austin, Texas, as follows:

"Number of men enlisted: Confederate armies, 700,000; Federal armies, 2,859,132." "Losses from all causes: Confederate, 437,000; Federal, 485,216."

Now, if the losses were 437,000 in the war, and many having died between the close of the war and 1890, and 432,000 were still living in 1890, what becomes of the 600,000 figure?

Again, we may go to the official records, and by adding the totals of the Confederate forces, as given early in the year 1864, we find there were then in the field, according to these reports, 481,160. If then we add all those who went into the service after that date under the urgent calls, and also add all who had been killed and died up to that time, and also add prisoners, what then becomes of the 600,000 figure?

The census report of 1890 alone takes the 600,000 number out of the case, for no method of ciphering can be devised to reduce the number of the dead during the war and for twenty-five years after, to only 168,000.

It is a plain proposition, therefore, that there were more than 600,000, and the question arises, is there any record evidence of the actual number?

The answer is, there is record evidence to show that the total number of Confederate soldiers was 1,000,000 or

more. Nor is this in any sense a new or recent statement. It is often said, when the facts are set forth, that a discovery has been made. It is no discovery, it is only bringing forward the record facts of the case, which have existed all the time. Even in the article of Mr. Moore it is shown by him that other estimates carried the figure up to 1,000,000.

The Century War Book, published in 1887, contains the following: "Official returns show the whole number of "men enrolled (present and absent) in the active armies "of the Confederacy as follows: January 1, 1862, 318,011; "January 1, 1863, 465,584; January 1, 1864, 472,781; Janu- "ary 1, 1865, 439,675. Very few, if any, of the local land "forces, and none of the naval, are included in this tab- "ular exhibit. If we take the 472,000 men in service at "the beginning of 1864, and add thereto 250,000 deaths "occurring prior to that date, it gives over 700,000. The "discharges for disability and other causes would probably "increase the number (inclusive of the militia and naval "forces) to over 1,000,000."

It is stated by James G. Blaine, in his history, that the Confederates numbered more than 1,000,000. In General Thruston's address it is said: "General Ainsworth, of the War Department, has recently estimated their strength at about 1,000,000."

In Hay and Nicholay's Life of Lincoln, the number is stated at about 1,000,000. In many other places we find this figure given. These are here mentioned to show that there has been a repetition of the 1,000,000 figure, as continuously as of the 600,000 figure, the former following the record facts, the other being assertion only.

A very careful estimate has been made of the total Confederate force from the number of regiments and other

organizations known to the records. By counting them all, and allowing a fair average number of soldiers to each, it has been estimated that the total number was about 1,000,000.

Another estimate has been made, based upon the record of returns of the Confederate armies at different periods, which also makes a total of about 1,000,000. Estimates have been made based upon the census of 1860, and upon the reports of the several States of the numbers they respectively furnished. These make more than 1,000,000.

Another method of computation is to take the official returns of the armies on both sides during the different years of the struggle, and note the ratio. This shows that the Federal forces never at any time outnumbered the Confederates as much as two to one; the Federals, also, being scattered, and the Confederates concentrated.

Manifestly, any estimate which counts the number formally *surrendering* as the total of the Confederates in the closing days of the war is absolutely valueless. The number surrendered was about 175,000. But the reports show that three months before the end, there were more than 450,000 Confederate soldiers. What became of the difference between that number and the 175,000? The reports also show that the army of Northern Virginia had 150,554 three months before the surrender, and at the surrender there were less than 40,000. What became of that difference? There can be no other answer than that many dispersed and went to their homes without waiting for the formalities of surrender. This is confirmed by the Confederate reports in those last three months, which show great losses by desertion.

General Thruston, who has carefully studied the records, has reached the conclusion that there were about 1,100,000 Confederates, all told.

Why were there not more than 600,000 Confederate soldiers? Why not more than 1,000,000? According to the census of 1860, there were more than 1,200,000 men subject to military duty in the eleven seceded States, and aid went to them from the border States of not less than 100,000. If the whole number of Confederate soldiers was only 600,000, we have the spectacle of the eleven Confederate States furnishing only 500,000 soldiers!

Never were more impassioned calls for volunteers. Never were reasons for going to war more urgently represented. It was called a fight against a ruthless, brutal invader. It was called a fight for home and country, for altar and fireside, wife, mother and child. The shirk was held up to scorn and execration. One of the great leaders said it was not a question of who could go, but a question of who could stay. Added to irresistible appeal were two conscription laws: one early in the war, taking all of the usual military age; and one later, robbing the cradle and the grave; and yet it is unblushingly claimed that only 500,000 men could be obtained from the eleven seceded States! If this were true, under all the circumstances, it would be cause for shame and humiliation. As it is not true, those who utter it ought to be branded as slanderers of the Southern people.

If we take the number of soldiers furnished to the Confederacy according to the published claims of the seceded States, we have the following table:

North Carolina (population 992,000)	127,000
Tennessee (population 1,100,000)	115,000
Alabama (population 964,000)	100,000
Mississippi (population 791,000)	85,000
Virginia (population 1,500,000)	150,000
Georgia (population 1,059,000)	130,000
Florida (population 140,000)	15,000
Louisiana (population 708,000)	53,000
South Carolina (population 703,000)	60,000
Arkansas (population 435,000)	45,000
Texas (population 604,000)	50,000
Making a total	930,000

To which must be added those who went from the border States of Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland, making a grand total of more than 1,000,000. These figures from the several States are authentically claimed and published. They are natural, considering the populations of the States. They are consistent with one another, according to population. Under the circumstances of the case, they are what would be expected. These figures show, with a fair uniformity, one soldier to ten of total population in all the States, and this very uniformity in the ratio confirms its correctness.

The census returns of the United States, including that of 1900, just published, show that there is one in five of population, of military age. There being 6,000,000 white population in the Confederacy, and the war lasting four years, giving opportunity, as Jefferson Davis said, for the growing-up youths to enter service, it is plain there were first and last more than 1,000,000 men in the South capable of military duty, the number in fact being over 1,200,000.

When, therefore, the aid of the border States is added, the question may be asked in wonder, why were there not more than 600,000 Confederate soldiers? Why not more than 1,000,000?

The foregoing presentation of the case is established by unimpeachable authority, as I will now proceed to show.

In January, 1864, an official report was made to the Confederate Government by Col. E. D. Blake, Superintendent of Registration, which is published in Volume 3, Series 4, page 95, War Records. It gives in detail the number of men furnished up to that time (close of 1863) from six of the Confederate States. The other five are not included in the report. The six which are reported are as follows:

	POPULATION.	FURNISHED.
Virginia	1,500,000	153,876
North Carolina	992,000	88,457
South Carolina	703,000	60,127
Georgia	1,057,000	106,157
Alabama	964,000	90,857
Mississippi	791,000	66,982
	6,007,000	566,456

Here is an authoritative official statement, made not for controversy, but for practical use in the midst of the conflict, and in strict line of duty. It outweighs all the approximations and guesses made since the war, for the purpose of minimizing the numbers engaged; and when analyzed, it conforms to the figures just spoken of as natural, reasonable and consistent.

The six States mentioned furnished, up to the close of 1863, 566,000 soldiers. The war lasted through 1864 and three months of 1865, during which time the appeals to rally to the cause were most urgent. The records show that in this period of the war General Lee was peculiarly active in urging the increase of the army. He repeatedly insisted that all should be brought into the field. He advised that all the work of the army should be done by negroes, so as to send all detailed men into the ranks. His language was: "Get out our entire arms-bearing population and relieve all detailed men with negroes." The records also show that at this period the Bureau of Conscription was sweeping into the ranks every male white, between seventeen and forty-five, with absolutely unsparing zeal and diligence. Under the extraordinary pressure just at that time, we may be sure these six States sent in enough new soldiers to run the figures far above 600,000. Thus, out of a total population of 6,000,000 in these six States, more than 600,000 soldiers went to the field. In this we see the ratio of one soldier to ten of the total population already mentioned. Now, let us take the other five seceded States:

Arkansas, with a population of . .	435,000
Texas, with a population of . . .	604,000
Tennessee, with a population of .	1,100,000
Louisiana, with a population of . .	708,000
Florida, with a population of . . .	140,000
	2,987,000

One soldier in ten of total population is as natural from these as from the above six, which were officially reported. This gives nearly 300,000 to be added to the above 600,000,

or over, and to this must be added those who went from the border States, Missouri, Kentucky and Maryland, making a total of 1,000,000 or more.

From all that has been said, it is plain that 600,000 in no way represents the total number of soldiers who fought for the Confederacy. It is also plain that 2,700,000 in no way represents the number of Federal soldiers. To so use these figures shows a partisanship which is willing to ignore the record facts, and accept as truth the pleasing fallacy of the simple assertion of three or four or five to one.

The inexorable logic of the official records shows that on the Federal side there were not over about 1,700,000 soldiers, while on the Confederate side, taking statements of the several States and adding them together, and taking the official Confederate records, there were not less than 1,000,000, and according to many estimates made from Confederate records—more than 1,000,000.

This corresponds with the figures given by the latest and most reliable historian, Woodrow Wilson, who, we have seen, places the number of Federal soldiers at 1,700,000. And in regard to the Confederates he uses this language:

"The total military population of the South was 1,065,000. 900,000 of these she drew into the armies."

To this 900,000 must be added, of course, those who went from the border States, which would make the number at least 1,000,000.

This eminent author, in stating the total military population of the South at 1,065,000, only gives the number as it stood at the outset of the war. In the course of the four years of struggle others came up to the requisite age, and were freely used, as shown not only by this author himself, but also by the President of the Confederacy in his speech in Georgia, in the year 1864.

Nor does this statement of the military population of the South exhaust its resources in men. It is well known that there is much to be done in warfare beside what is done on the firing line. A vast amount of work and labor must be performed, requiring even greater physical strength than to carry and fire the musket. The 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 of negroes in the South are by no means to be left out in considering the strength of the Confederacy.

Jefferson Davis says in his history, Volume 1, page 303: "Much of our success was due to the much abused insti- "tution of African servitude, for it enabled the white men "to go into the army and leave the cultivation of their "fields and care of their flocks, as well as their wives and "children, to those who, in the language of the Constitu- "tion, were 'held to service or labor.'"

From the beginning of the struggle to the end, negroes were employed in large numbers to do the work which in the Federal armies was done by enlisted soldiers. Mr. Davis might, therefore, enlarge his remark that the negroes did the home work while the white men were fighting, by saying also that negroes did the fatigue duty of the armies while the white soldiers fought on the front line.

We read in Scripture that when the people of Israel, on their return from Babylon, were rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem, in constant dread of enemies, one half wrought in the work, while the other half held the spear and shield.

Not unlike this was the situation during our great struggle. The population of the South was about two-thirds white and one-third negroes. The two-thirds handled the spear and shield while the other third wrought in work and labor, not alone on the farms, but along with the armies in the field.

Fort Donelson was constructed by negro labor drawn from Tennessee and Kentucky by forcible impressment. The records show that negroes labored on the fortifications for the army of Northern Virginia from Manassas to Petersburg. Also at Fort Fisher and Wilmington, and Charleston and Savannah, in Georgia, at Vicksburg, and all other points. The reports of Confederate generals, of the Confederate government, and of State governments, make numerous mention of negro labor. At an early period Generals Magruder and Kirby Smith, in the West, report that many soldiers were detailed as teamsters and that their places should be supplied by negroes. The Confederate Congress authorized this to be done. General Beauregard ordered negroes to be employed on fortifications. At one time General Lee called for 6,000 negroes to labor on fortifications, and was authorized to impress them. Again, the Secretary of War directed General Lee to impress 20,000 negroes for employment in the army. General Bragg advocated calling out the negroes just as troops were called out. The Legislatures of the States passed laws for impressment of negroes. The authorities at Richmond authorized the military to obtain as many slaves as were necessary for repairing railroads.

Such are some of the numerous proofs found in the official records of the immense use of negroes in performing the labor of the army which would otherwise have fallen upon the soldiers, thus releasing the soldier from handling the pick and spade and axe and wagon whip, so that he might handle the musket.

Against the armament of the South, with all its strength as shown by the record facts, the soldiers for the Union had to advance and contend. They were to stand to the work

until organized effort to dismember the great American republic was broken to pieces and destroyed. The soldiers who by repeated re-enlistments made the paper aggregate of 2,700,000, but in actual numbers were not more than 1,700,000, had to carry on the war through difficulties which appear insurmountable as we now look back upon them. That it required more soldiers to wage the war against the Confederacy than were necessary to defend it, is too plain a proposition for anything but simple mention. General Thruston, in discussing the subject, illustrates it by the war in South Africa. He says superiority of ten or more to one did not bring success to British arms at once. Great Britain sent out 445,000 soldiers against 30,000 or 40,000 Boers. Yet this "wretched little population of Boers," as Lord Salisbury called them, defied the power and prowess of the whole British Empire for two or three years.

The fighting qualities of the people of the seceded States, the skill of their officers, the enthusiasm for their cause, were all of the highest order. Such people were not to be quickly overcome. They had a great and rich territory, and the aid of a laboring population, able-bodied, and completely subservient. They fought on the defensive, with short lines of communication, with no foe in the rear. That their cause did not succeed reflects a credit upon the fighting qualities of the national soldiery, and upon the ability of their leaders, which makes all words of praise insignificant. The best material of the country volunteered to save the Union, and no eulogy can do justice to the great uprising. The sudden display of energy, the march in panoply of war, the purely patriotic enthusiasm, the continued resolution, and undying courage and devotion through campaigns and battle, all go to make up the brightest page in the annals of war.

The history of the great struggle was written and recorded as it progressed. It is contained in the documents and reports of the period. To the extent this documentary history is falsified by subsequent writings, the truth is disregarded. When writers set down Federal victories as due to "overwhelming numbers," they are not writing history but sentiment. When every Confederate defeat is attributed to "fearful odds" and the "thin gray line," the words used have no basis in fact. When great Confederate triumphs are declared to have been barely frustrated by some purely accidental "if," the stubborn records rise up in irresistible ridicule."

No writing since the war deserves the name of history, unless the writer duly respects the record facts of the period. No writer who puts down 2,700,000 soldiers against 600,000 soldiers is to be respected as a historian. No sentimentalist who will have it that it was a case of one Southerner to five Yankees states the truth. The task was accomplished without great disproportion. The odds were not great, but small, considering the stupendous task. And therefore, under all the circumstances attending advance on one side and defense on the other, no writing can be called history, *which does not catch the full spirit of the magnificent courage of the national soldiery.*

Nothing but foolish sentiment can fail to see the tremendous fact, that in number but little exceeding a million and a half, they waged successful war against a million or more fighting on their own ground.

What possible praise can do justice to that devoted band who went forth from the loyal element of the country and followed the flag until it waved over a reunited land?

Consider the army of the Potomac. Upon it was cast the double duty of defending the national capital, and

of advancing against the Confederate army. From the beginning, the capture of Washington was contemplated. It was freely said the Confederate flag would soon float over the Capitol. Alexander Stephens pointed out that, as Maryland was a Southern State, the District of Columbia belonged to the South, and declared its surrender would be enforced. It was felt that the capture of Washington, more than anything else, would induce foreign recognition. To guard against this, a portion of the army remained in the defenses, whatever was the nature of the campaign. The greatest triumph the Confederates could have achieved would have been taking the national capital. Thus both armies had a mission, offensive and defensive. Both were contending for the mastery. It was as much the duty of the Confederates to overcome the Union Army, as for the Union Army to overcome them. For nearly four years they fought each other, without the capture of either Richmond or Washington. The aggressive movements of both armies were baffled, and both were entitled to the highest credit for tenacity of purpose. If the army of the Potomac was turned back in its advances, it also turned back the great advances of its antagonist. At Antietam, and Gettysburg, and in Early's attempt to capture Washington, it was the army of the Potomac which successfully resisted. At the last, when the crossing of the Rapidan appeared to fail as formerly, the army of the Potomac greeted with shouts the order to move on, and finally broke through every obstacle and followed its retreating foe to utter overthrow.

In every other section there was regular and steady progress from the beginning. West Virginia and Missouri were soon occupied permanently. Success at Mill Spring and Donelson cleared Kentucky and a large part of Tennessee. Nashville, Memphis and New Orleans were taken.

Then Chattanooga, Vicksburg and Knoxville. Then Atlanta, Savannah and Mobile. In all this progress, nothing gained was given up. All places taken were won against fierce resistance, and held by forces left to guard them. It would be impossible to mention any soldiery in any age or country which exemplified in a higher degree all the best qualities of soldiership than those of the western armies, who followed Buell, Rosecrans, Thomas, Sherman, Grant, accomplishing these results.

These armies pushed their way southward, guarding as they went, and drawing supplies from an increasingly distant rear. Long lines of communication had to be constantly guarded against organized raids, and against small bands, which sprang up among a hostile population. Guarding the country, as the forward movement went on, depleted the forces at the front. Like a volume of water started toward a plain, the head pushed on, but much was left behind. Thus the national troops were scattered, while their opponents concentrated, and at the front the attenuated lines in blue contended against equal or even greater numbers massed behind defenses which had to be carried.

Sometimes it seemed the difficulties were insuperable. The hearts of statesmen failed. A great party pronounced the war a failure, and its candidate for the Presidency against the ever faithful Lincoln, received forty-five per cent. of the votes of the people of those States from which the soldiers of the Union had to be drawn.

But with the volunteers in the field who had gone from the loyal homes in the loyal States to fight the battle, there was no thought but to continue the struggle. The three-year men re-enlisted for the war, while freezing and starving at the front, in the winter of 1863 and 1864.

Commanders of armies, corps, divisions, regiments and companies, and enlisted men, suffered deprivations together, confident they would work out the problem.

On the other side there was similarity, and yet contrast. The Confederates endured and contended tenaciously. They suffered and struggled, and in this they were like their opponents; but, from first to last, they never accomplished a single affirmative success. They often postponed success to the Federals, but all their own best laid schemes to achieve real victory came to naught. The forward movement at Shiloh was turned back. Bragg's movement into Kentucky was a dismal failure. The victory at Chickamauga was barren of results. Longstreet's movement to Knoxville failed. Hood's advance upon Nashville wrecked his army. In the East the invasion of Maryland failed at Antietam, and the advance into Pennsylvania failed at Gettysburg. Early's effort to capture Washington was a failure. From first to last, they never took and held any place whatever.

All things considered, it is not strange that the struggle lasted four years. It is, in fact, a marvel that an organization so vast and powerful as the Confederacy, was so completely overthrown.

That we now have a government under which we can live in peace, is due to the armies which fought the battle for the Union. That we have a country standing to-day foremost among the nations of the world, and for which its whole people, irrespective of sectional lines, are filled with patriotic pride, is because in the hour of its peril its defenders rallied to the flag, and followed and upheld it until all became united under its folds.

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